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Close foreign policy cooperation among a limited number of EU member states is 
generally looked upon with suspicion as it is associated with ‘directoires’ of large 
member states. The central argument of this paper is that, under certain conditions, the 
specialisation and division of labour among the member states can strengthen both the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the foreign policy of the EU. This paper proposes the 
establishment of a system of small, specialised EU core groups that focus on particular 
foreign policy issues. An EU core group  consists of (representatives of) the high 
representative, the Commission and the presidency and of a limited number of EU 
member states that are both willing and able to devote extra efforts and resources to a 
specific foreign policy matter. A system of EU core groups can help to alleviate some 
major problems of EU foreign policy: the cleavage between large and middle-sized or 
small member states, the predominance of uncommon interests, a lack of cooperation 
and vertical consistency, and the growing irrelevance of the Council in an EU with 25 or 
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EU CORE GROUPS 
SPECIALISATION AND DIVISION OF LABOUR 




An analysis of the foreign policy of the European Union (EU) points to the rising importance of 
small groups of member states that take the lead in the operationalisation of EU foreign policy 
or in tackling the most delicate aspects of foreign policy matters. The best-known examples are 
the ‘directoire/directorate’-type activities of France, the UK and Germany in the context of the 
EU-3 negotiations with Iran (together with the high representative for the common foreign and 
security policy) and of the Contact Group for the Balkans (together with Italy, the US and 
Russia).
1 In addition, there are other, less visible informal groups that include smaller member 
states along with representatives of EU institutions. Examples are the informal Contact Groups 
on Afghanistan and on the Democratic Republic (DR) of Congo, and the EU Core Group on 
Somalia.
2 The latter was to some extent legitimatised by the Council, which in March 2006 it 
“welcomed the establishment of an EU contact group on Somalia in Nairobi to engage on behalf 
of the EU and in consultation with EU Heads of Mission in direct dialogue with the Transitional 
Federal Government”.
3  
The activities of these kinds of informal groups are often seen as undermining the common 
foreign policy of the EU. This paper claims, however, that under certain conditions, the creation 
and functioning of small groups of countries and representatives of the EU institutions can be 
turned into an asset for the foreign policy of the EU. The central argument of this paper is that 
the introduction of specialisation and division of labour among the EU member states can 
strengthen both the effectiveness and the legitimacy of the EU’s foreign policy.  
 
                                                      
* Stephan Keukeleire is a Jean Monnet Professor in European Integration and EU foreign policy at the 
Catholic University of Leuven (Institute for International and European Policy). He is a Visiting Professor 
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1 In both cases, the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, Mr Javier Solana, 
or one of his representatives is also involved in the deliberations. For an analysis of the arguments pro and 
contra directorates, see Keukeleire (2001). For the Contact Group on the Balkans, see Schwegmann 
(2000), Keukeleire (2001) and Gégout (2002). For the EU-3 on Iran, see Delpech (2004 and 2005), Borda 
(2005) and Posch (2006). 
2 The informal Contact Group on Afghanistan includes the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, France, Italy, 
Spain, the Council Secretariat and the Commission – with the first three being its key members. The 
informal Contact Group on the DR Congo has France, the UK, Belgium and the Council’s Secretariat 
General as its key members. The EU Core Group on Somalia, which was created early 2004, now consists 
primarily of the UK, Italy, Sweden and the European Commission. 
3 See the Press Release from the 2718
th meeting of the Council of the European Union (General Affairs 
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The specialisation and division of labour can be considered as necessary for two sets of reasons. 
First, these modalities are necessary to allow for a more operational and dynamic foreign policy 
in an EU with 25 or more member states. They are indispensable to cope with the major 
differences in the member states’ foreign policy capabilities and interests, the widening 
cleavage between larger and smaller countries, and the growing tension between the objective of 
a ‘common’ foreign policy and the needs of an operational foreign policy. This approach is even 
more important in view of the non-ratification of the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe and 
the doubts about an EU minister for foreign affairs and a European External Action Service 
(EEAS) – leading to the need for other devices to strengthen EU foreign policy. Second, the 
specialisation and division of labour are necessary to tackle some fundamental problems of EU 
foreign policy that are often disregarded and were not or not sufficiently tackled by the 
Constitutional Treaty: the predominance of ‘uncommon’ interests, the member states’ lack of 
interest in each other’s foreign policy priorities, the problem of vertical consistency (between 
EU and national foreign policies), and the problems of legitimacy, credibility and visibility.  
This paper proposes a method to organise the specialisation and division of labour through a 
flexible system of small, specialised EU core groups (or EU liaising groups
4) that focus on 
particular foreign policy matters. An EU core group consists of (representatives of) the high 
representative, the Commission and the presidency (or of the EU minister for foreign affairs if 
the post is created) and of a limited number of EU member states that are both willing and able 
to devote extra efforts and national resources to a specific foreign policy matter (i.e. a country, 
region, conflict or thematic issue). This composition implies that different EU core groups will 
include different sets of member states. The main function of EU core groups is to take special 
responsibility in developing a more dynamic, coherent and (pro)active policy towards a specific 
policy matter: first through the support for the preparation, elaboration, implementation and 
follow-up of EU policy, and second through the intensification, pooling and stronger 
coordination of the national efforts and assets of the EU core group’s member states.  
The first and second sections of this paper focus on various underlying but often neglected 
political problems of EU foreign policy, in order to explain more clearly the need for and added 
value of specialised EU core groups. In the third section, the various dimensions of the proposal 
to establish a system of EU core groups are explored: their composition, conditions for creating 
an EU core group, their functions, their relationship with the EU’s existing institutional 
framework and policies and differences in comparison with other flexibility mechanisms (such 
as enhanced cooperation). This discussion is followed by an overview in the fourth and fifth 
sections of the advantages of a system of EU core groups, as well as the limitations and 
potential risks.  
The analysis leads to some – at first sight – paradoxical conclusions. It demonstrates that a 
mechanism of EU core groups could not only increase the role of member states but could also 
strengthen the relevance of the Community method and of the institutions and procedures of the 
EU’s first pillar. It illuminates the point that bringing national diplomacies more to the centre of 
EU foreign policy can reverse a continuing trend of nationalisation (or renationalisation) of 
foreign policy. And it reveals that accepting diversity in member states’ foreign policy interests 
and capabilities, together with introducing a division of labour and specialisation, can actually 
bring more unity and consistency to EU foreign policy.  
                                                      
4 The idea of ‘EU Liaising Groups’ was launched by the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs Karel De 
Gucht (2005) in his 27 October speech in Helsinki on “Towards greater effect and appeal – Strengthening 
EU foreign policy”. The label ‘EU Liaison Group’ has the advantage of avoiding the link with the 
concept of a ‘core Europe’ (which is often perceived as excluding member states). I opt for the label ‘EU 
core groups’ as it reflects more correctly the nature and role of EU core groups, which is broader than that 
of the ‘EU Liaison Groups’ proposed by Mr. De Gucht. EU CORE GROUPS: SPECIALISATION AND DIVISION OF LABOUR IN EU FOREIGN POLICY | 3 
 
2.  Disregarded underlying political problems of EU foreign policy  
Before going into detail on the proposal to create a system of EU core groups, it is useful to 
explore some fundamental problems of EU foreign policy that in political debates and academic 
analysis receive less attention than they deserve.  
Uncommon interests and mutual obstruction 
A first set of problems is often lumped together under the headings ‘lack of common interest’ or 
‘lack of political will’. Yet a closer look at these problems reveals that there is far more to it. 
Particularly the factor of lack of political will on the part of member states is too easily used to 
explain the constraints and failures of the EU, which hinders both an accurate diagnosis and the 
search for possible solutions.
5  
Diverging interests and sometimes outright disagreements among member states explain the 
lack of common policy towards some major foreign policy issues (such as the Iraq war in 2004) 
and the weakness of some of the existing policies (such as that towards Russia). In many cases, 
however, it is not the existence of opposing interests and substantial disagreements that impedes 
the development of a more dynamic foreign policy. Particularly in foreign policy matters that 
are situated slightly lower on the international agenda, the real reason is simply the lack of 
interest in a certain foreign policy issue. Historical, geographical, economic and other factors 
explain why most member states are only actively interested in a certain number of third 
countries and foreign policy issues, which are often of less interest for other member states. To 
give one example: developments in East Timor might attract much attention in Portugal and a 
couple of other member states, but politicians and public opinion in most other EU states do not 
really care about what happens in that country and may not even be able to situate East Timor 
on a world map.  
This lack of interest in each other’s foreign policy priorities explains why member states that 
want a more dynamic EU policy towards certain issues often see their efforts blocked or slowed 
down by other member states that are not interested in the issue and have no interests to defend. 
As a result, EU foreign policy does not often surpass the level of declaratory diplomacy, 
‘political dialogue’ and traditional contractual relations with a country or region. The 
development of new military and civilian crisis-management instruments and the growing role 
played by High Representative Javier Solana and his staff have allowed the EU to develop a 
policy towards issues that initially received only peripheral attention from a majority of member 
states (such as the DR Congo). Nevertheless, many foreign policy priorities of member states 
are left out. And even when an initial lack of interest can be overcome, member states discover 
that it remains difficult to find support from the other partners to further upgrade the EU policy 
and develop a more comprehensive and dynamic approach. 
The mutual indifference of member states towards each other’s issues and the resulting 
obstruction of a more activist EU foreign policy have a major negative impact. First, it leads to 
disappointment and frustration for those member states demanding a dynamic EU policy 
towards a specific third country, region or issue. By not taking member states’ traditional, 
                                                      
5 For (ab)use of the arguments concerning lack of political will and lack of common interests as 
explanations for the problems of EU foreign policy, see Keukeleire (2002 and 2006). 4 | STEPHAN KEUKELEIRE 
 
national foreign-policy objectives
6 with sufficient seriousness, the EU undermines the 
relevance, credibility and legitimacy of its foreign policy – and of the EU as such. After all, 
from a member state’s perspective, what is the point of having an EU foreign policy that does 
not contribute to tackling problems and crises in areas that it considers of crucial importance? 
Second, disappointment and frustration about the limited added value of EU foreign policy for 
national foreign policy priorities partially explains member states’ restrained commitment 
towards EU foreign policy in general and the extent of their willingness to support initiatives 
proposed by other states. These factors often lead to mutual obstruction. To be concrete: Why 
should the Scandinavian countries support a more activist policy towards Mediterranean 
countries if these member states are reluctant to prioritise the Northern Dimension in EU foreign 
policy?  
Third, this situation is one explanation for member states’ choice of unilateralism, initiatives 
with other countries, ad hoc formulas and contact groups outside the EU framework. These 
activities in turn further increase distrust and tension among member states and undermine the 
credibility and relevance of the EU as an international actor. 
Fourth, there are also negative consequences in terms of the visibility of EU foreign policy. 
National press in general focuses on the major international conflicts and crises (where the EU 
is often absent) or on those countries, regions or issues that are a foreign policy priority of that 
member state (where the EU is generally inactive too). Together, this means that the public 
literally does not see (on television or in newspapers) that there is an EU foreign policy, which 
again undermines the credibility and legitimacy of the EU. This is problematic for the EU as 
public opinion polls demonstrate that, taken together, foreign and security policy is one of the 
domains where the European population wants an active EU.
7 This situation is also one of the 
major problems for the EU’s quickly developing European security and defence policy. The EU 
is increasingly involved in crises-management operations in different parts of the world, but this 
is barely visible for the general public. For instance, how many EU citizens have seen television 
images of the EU’s Aceh Monitoring Mission in Indonesia or of the EU’s largest military 
operation, Operation Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina? 
Considering these disadvantages, the EU might profit not only from focusing attention on the 
common  interests of the EU, but also from devising methods to take important uncommon 
interests more seriously – interests that rank are highly for only some member states. The 
challenge is thus to find a method for turning the differences in member states’ foreign policy 
interests and capabilities from obstacles into assets for the foreign policy of the EU.  
Increasing in this way the added value of EU foreign policy for the member states may also 
contribute to tackling their so-called ‘lack of political will’. Indeed, from the perspective of the 
preceding analysis, the question is not whether member states demonstrate sufficient political 
will to support EU foreign policy, but whether there are sufficient incentives for national 
politicians and diplomats to generate the necessary political will. Further refined, the question is 
how the EU’s foreign policy system can develop mechanisms to facilitate the generation of such 
political will and to increase the commitment of member states.  
                                                      
6 Specific examples include: the Northern Dimension for the Scandinavian and Baltic States; the 
Mediterranean area for the Southern member states; Africa for France, the UK, Portugal and Belgium; 
Latin America for Spain and Portugal; Asia for the UK, the Netherlands and Portugal; the former Soviet 
republics for the new member states; and specific international conferences for Germany and the 
Scandinavian countries. 
7 See the EU’s bi-annual Eurobarometer survey (retrieved from http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/ 
standard_en.htm). EU CORE GROUPS: SPECIALISATION AND DIVISION OF LABOUR IN EU FOREIGN POLICY | 5 
 
Vertical inconsistency and a lack of coordination and cooperation  
A second set of problems is related to the consistency and coherence of EU foreign policy. 
When this issue is discussed, most attention goes to institutional and horizontal consistency. 
This aspect concerns the consistency between the policies developed in the EU’s first pillar and 
second pillar by different political and bureaucratic systems, and the consistency among the 
various policies of the EU: development policy, trade policy, common foreign and security 
policy (CFSP), etc. There is, however, much less focus on the problems of vertical consistency 
between EU and national foreign policies and of horizontal consistency among the different 
national foreign policies.
8 Yet, these two dimensions of consistency are at least as important as 
the other dimensions, given that foreign policy is a shared competence of the EU and its 
member states,
9 that the foreign policy capabilities are still limited and that in specific domains 
of international relations the member states’ foreign policies remain essential. 
For the effectiveness and credibility of EU foreign policy, vertical consistency between the 
policy agreed within the EU institutions and that of all 25 member states is needed. But for 
many foreign policy issues, what really counts is the consistency between the policies of the 
central EU actors (the high representative, Council Secretariat and European Commission) and 
the often small number of member states that are really interested in the issue and that can make 
a difference in that dossier – as a result of their economic leverage, their special relationship 
with a third country, etc. One of the weaknesses of the existing EU system is exactly that it does 
not contain sufficient mechanisms to guarantee and foster this vertical consistency between the 
policies of the central EU actors and the partial number (and varying set) of relevant member 
states.
10 
The same reasoning applies to the horizontal consistency among national foreign policies 
and the resulting need for close cooperation and coordination among national foreign 
policies. EU foreign policy not only relies on common action through common instruments and 
common actors, but also on “strengthening systematic cooperation between member states in 
the conduct of policy” (Art. 12, TEU). Again, not all member states are relevant for all foreign 
policy dossiers. To be effective it is imperative that particularly the relevant member states do 
cooperate systematically and do strengthen their cooperation and coordination. The existing EU 
system, however, does not provide mechanisms and structures to practically facilitate 
cooperation and coordination among groups of pertinent member states – a situation that is 
related to the constraints of the current set-up of the Council and its substructures. 
The growing irrelevance of the Council and of national representatives 
The third set of problems is connected with the policy-making in the Council and its 
substructures, which suffers from the fatal dual disease of too many ministers (and other 
national representatives) and too many items on the agenda.  
It is clear that in a Council meeting with 25 ministers, real debates are nearly impossible and 
indeed are also becoming rare. The resulting implication is that the decision-making and 
problem-solving capabilities of the Council of Ministers are under strain. Because of the large 
number of participants, the possibility for national ministers to intervene in the Council debates 
                                                      
8 For an analysis of the various aspects of consistency, see Nuttall (2005). 
9 For the tensions in EU external competences, see Gauttier (2004) and Duke (2006). 
10 An exception is the informal (but not very transparent) mechanisms achieved through (former) national 
diplomats who are members of the Council Secretariat General and the private staff and Planning Unit of 
the High Representative. 6 | STEPHAN KEUKELEIRE 
 
and to express and defend national interests and positions is more restricted than before. These 
circumstances not only cause ministers of foreign affairs to feel increasingly irrelevant in the 
Council meetings, they also make the Council meetings and their participation in it increasingly 
irrelevant for member states. This growing feeling of irrelevance in an expanding EU is not only 
true for meetings of the Council of Ministers, but also for the meetings of the various 
substructures of the Council: the Committee of Permanent Representatives (Coreper), the 
Political and Security Committee and the many working groups. The psychological effect on the 
national ministers of foreign affairs is much more significant, however, and potentially harming 
for the EU, as these ministers are not really used to feeling irrelevant. In short, in addition to the 
diminished output legitimacy (because of its constrained problem-solving capacity), the Council 
structures are thus also faced with a diminished input legitimacy, which threatens to undermine 
the overall legitimacy and acceptability of the Council’s decisions and of the EU as a foreign 
policy forum as such. Obviously, this also induces member states to use other fora to promote 
national foreign policy goals, such as other international organisations and ad hoc groups with a 
limited number of states.  
The ‘too many participants’ problem is further exacerbated by the ‘too many issues’ obstacle. 
As a result of the expansion of the foreign policy instruments and activities of the EU, the 
ministers of foreign affairs as well as the various substructures of the Council are confronted 
with an increasingly overloaded and impossible agenda.
11 The example of the agenda of a recent 
meeting of the Africa Working Group (of 13 September 2006) illustrates the problem. During 
this meeting, the Working Group had to discuss: Sudan, DR Congo, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Somalia, Malawi, Madagascar, Togo, the progress report on the joint EU–Africa strategy, the 
EU’s concept for strengthening African capabilities for the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts, the Commission Communication on Governance (as part of the EU 
Strategy for Africa), and the EU Electoral Observation programme for 2006 and 2007. Member 
states that have a strong interest in a particular African country or issue thus see their foreign 
policy priority drown in the large number of agenda points. It is evident that it is impossible for 
the Working Group to grasp the details of all these issues and to discuss all of them in a serious 
way. A setting with more than 25 participants is not at all appropriate to develop an operational 
policy towards such a large number of complex issues that goes beyond generalities (such as the 
wish to promote peace, stability and democracy). It is also clear that the Council presidency 
cannot be expected to take the lead in all these foreign policy dossiers, except if the presidency 
is held by London or Paris with their extensive central services and diplomatic networks in 
Africa. Moreover, the mere bi-monthly meetings of the Africa Working Group are not sufficient 
if developments in a specific country or EU involvement in intensive mediation efforts require 
the EU to react swiftly and in a flexible way. In this context, it is not surprising that member 
states will see these meetings as insufficient and will turn to other fora and informal groupings 
to tackle their foreign policy priority in a more serious way – inside or outside the EU foreign 
policy setting. 
3.  Creating a system of EU core groups 
Summing up the previous analysis, EU foreign policy is challenged to devise methods to focus 
more on uncommon interests, to increase its added value and relevance for the member states, to 
facilitate the generation of political will, to increase vertical consistency and cooperation among 
national foreign policies and to adapt the Council structures. The argument developed in this 
paper is that the introduction of specialisation and division of labour through the creation of a 
                                                      
11 See also the analysis in Gomez & Peterson (2001). EU CORE GROUPS: SPECIALISATION AND DIVISION OF LABOUR IN EU FOREIGN POLICY | 7 
 
system of EU core groups can contribute to meeting this challenge. This section spells out in 
detail the various dimensions of the establishment and functioning of EU core groups.  
Composition 
An EU core group consists of (representatives of) the high representative for the EU’s CFSP, 
the Commission and the presidency of the Council, as well as a number of member states that 
accept the commitment to intensify the foreign policy efforts towards a certain foreign policy 
matter (a country, region, crisis or thematic issue). These member states have to be willing and 
capable over a longer period of time to: i) devote extra energy, time, money and other national 
resources in support of the EU’s policy towards a specific foreign policy matter (a country, 
region or issue); and ii) step up, coordinate and pool their national foreign policy efforts towards 
that foreign policy matter – beyond those already undertaken by the member states and the EU 
as a whole. The European Commission can be excluded from an EU core group if the main 
focus of the core group is military crisis-management or if it is concerned with strategic military 
matters. Membership in EU core groups can change over time, in accordance with the evolving 
requirements of the subject area and the evolving attention of the EU core group.  
To alleviate member states’ concerns that EU core groups would become restricted playgrounds 
for former colonial powers or for EU countries that border the third country or region that is the 
subject of the EU core group, it can be decided that an EU core group should also include at 
least one EU member state with no historical links or direct borders with the third country or 
region concerned – i.e. a country with a more neutral status. This strategy may also be useful as 
an additional guarantee that the activities of an EU core group do not conflict with the general 
foreign policy of the EU. The involvement of countries with no direct historical or geographical 
ties to the subjects of an EU core group requires, however, that these countries commit 
themselves to the issue or area and have the capacity to dedicate special efforts in its regard. The 
northern member states of the EU (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) prove that this is not 
impossible by their very active foreign policy towards several non-European countries with 
which they have no particular historical links and no specific economic or other interests at 
stake (e.g. Indonesia, Somalia and the Great Lakes region in Africa). 
At the highest political level, an EU core group consists of the high representative, the 
commissioner for external relations (and/or the commissioner for development), the minister of 
the country that assumes the presidency of the Council and the ministers of foreign affairs or 
other relevant ministers of the member states that take part in the EU core group. In the core 
group, the role of the high representative can be filled by an EU special representative who 
works under his authority. In the case of ratification of the Constitutional Treaty – or the 
creation of an EU minister for foreign affairs or a comparable function outside the 
Constitutional Treaty’s framework – the EU minister would take the place of the high 
representative, the responsible commissioner and the presidency. If the Constitutional Treaty is 
not ratified, the Council can decide that the presidency of the Council will not take part in the 
EU core group’s activities and that the high representative (or the EU special representative who 
works under his authority) will be the Council’s main representative in the EU core group.  
At lower diplomatic and administrative levels, an EU core group consists of specialised 
diplomats or civil servants from the participating member states, the high representative’s 
Policy Unit or personal secretariat, the Council Secretariat and the administration of the 
Commission. If the EEAS is created, then some of these diplomats or civil servants should be 
replaced by diplomats or civil servants from the EEAS (depending on the form the EEAS 
assumes).
  The Council can also decide to involve representatives of the various military 
structures or other bodies of the EU in the activities of the EU core group. 8 | STEPHAN KEUKELEIRE 
 
Diplomats from the participating countries and institutions may not only meet in Brussels; they 
may also meet and act in other relevant places, such as in the third country or region that is the 
subject of the EU core group, or in New York to coordinate with and within the UN bodies and 
other international organisations.  
The members of an EU core group agree among themselves on the management of their group 
and activities. Within the core group, there can be further specialisation and division of labour 
among the participant countries and institutions, with different (sets of) actors focusing on 
different dimensions of the policy towards the area or issue, depending on their competences 
and expertise. This specialisation and division of labour is particularly useful when an EU core 
group focuses on various dimensions of the external action vis-à-vis an area or issue. Depending 
on the need and circumstances, these dimensions can be related to mediation or reconciliation 
efforts, civilian and military crisis-management, post-war reconstruction, institution-building, 
development cooperation, technical cooperation, environmental protection initiatives, etc. 
Contingent upon the dimensions tackled by an EU core group, different specialised actors 
(ministers, diplomats, civil servants, agencies and experts) from the participating member states 
and EU institutions can be involved.  
Criteria or conditions for creating EU core groups 
An EU core group can be created when the following conditions are met:  
•  when a number of member states (for instance, from three member states upwards), the high 
representative and the responsible commissioner judge that a specific geographical area or 
foreign policy issue requires a more active EU policy and more extensive pooling and 
coordination of their efforts and resources; or 
•  when the Council asks a number of member states, the high representative and the 
Commissioner to intensify the policy of the EU towards a specific area or issue or to take 
the lead in developing a more active policy towards this area or issue (or both); 
•  and when these member states i) accept the commitment to devote in a concerted way and 
over a longer period of time additional efforts and national resources to this priority area 
and ii) also have the capabilities to do so in terms of personnel, financial means and other 
national assets (e.g. diplomatic or military leverage, close formal and informal political 
contacts with the elites in a third country, economic support or leverage, technical expertise, 
credibility to act as a mediator in a region, observers or peacekeeping forces and 
development cooperation). 
EU core groups can concentrate on specific geographical areas, on thematic foreign policy 
issues or on a combination of both. Geographically organised EU core groups can focus their 
efforts on a specific country, group of countries or a region within a country or set of countries 
(for instance, a conflict area overlapping the borders of countries). Examples of thematic foreign 
policy issues that may be the subject of an EU core group are the spread of light weapons, 
security-sector reform efforts, child soldiers in conflict areas, institution-building and the link 
between conflicts and the production of narcotics. The focus of an EU core group can be rather 
broad and comprehensive or somewhat restricted in scope. 
EU core groups cannot be established for all foreign policy areas, as this approach will not 
always be possible, desirable or useful. The creation of a particular EU core group may be 
excluded in the case of fundamental differences in interests and approaches among EU member 
states with regard to that foreign policy issue. When could this formula of division of labour and 
functional specialisation then be used? A mechanism of specialised EU core groups can be 
particularly useful for the many foreign policy domains that are situated slightly lower on the EU CORE GROUPS: SPECIALISATION AND DIVISION OF LABOUR IN EU FOREIGN POLICY | 9 
 
international agenda and that are considered of major importance by only a limited number of 
member states. An EU core group can even be useful for well-established EU foreign policy 
areas (such as the Balkans or the Middle East), when it is seen as beneficial or necessary to 
intensify efforts in a specific sub-dimension to achieve the EU’s foreign policy goals for that 
area. The creation of an EU core group may also be considered for policy issues that are already 
the subject of informal ‘contact groups’ or ‘friends of’ groups (e.g. in the context of the UN), 
created by a number of EU and non-EU countries.
12 In such cases closer interaction among the 
various EU actors involved and a closer link with the broader EU policy can be useful too. 
EU core groups can be created in several ways. One possibility – and probably the most logical 
and natural – is that an EU core group is established incrementally and organically from below, 
based on practical experience and concrete needs and opportunities. Through this process an EU 
core group on a specific foreign policy issue gradually crystallises on the basis of closer 
interaction and cooperation between diplomats and civil servants from some member states and 
the EU institutions. Another possibility is that political leaders decide to create an EU core 
group when at a certain moment the need is felt by some member states or the Council to 
intensify policy towards a specific foreign policy issue. In order to guarantee the required 
flexibility and avoid protracted and difficult formal negotiations, the EU core group has to be 
created by a political agreement rather than through a formal legal agreement or detailed 
mandate by the Council.  
Functions of EU core groups 
The function of an EU core group is to take special responsibility for developing a more 
dynamic, coherent and (pro)active policy towards a specific area or issue – through its support 
for the preparation, elaboration, implementation and follow-up of EU policy, and through the 
intensification and pooling of the efforts and assets of the EU core group’s members. An EU 
core group can fulfil this function in different ways, depending on the specific needs of the area 
or policy issue. What follows is a non-exhaustive list of possible tasks for an EU core group: 
•  support the Council, the Council’s substructures, the high representative (or EU special 
representative) and/or the Commission in preparing new EU initiatives and decisions, or in 
concretising, implementing and assuring the follow-up of the decisions of the EU vis-à-vis 
this area or issue;  
•  examine, propose and apply measures to strengthen the various dimensions of horizontal 
and vertical consistency – with a special emphasis on the consistency of the national 
policies of the member states in the EU core group; 
•  pool more intensively the policy measures and efforts of the members of the EU core group 
or adopt new measures to further the objectives of the EU towards this area or issue,   
 
                                                      
12 Examples of such groups are the Friends of the Secretary General on Georgia/Abkhazia (which 
includes, in addition to non-EU countries, France, Germany and the UK), the Group of Friends of Darfur 
(which includes France, the UK, the Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, the EU Council presidency and the 
European Commission), the International Contact Group on Liberia (which includes France, the UK, the 
EU Council presidency and the Commission), the Grupo de Amigos on Venezuela (which includes Spain 
and Portugal), the Core Group on Northern Uganda (which includes the Netherlands and the UK), the 
Core Group on Lebanon (which includes France, the UK, Italy, the EU Council presidency and the 
Commission), and the ‘Friends of the Nairobi Declaration’ on the fight against the traffic of small arms 
(which includes seven EU countries and the Commission). 10 | STEPHAN KEUKELEIRE 
 
particularly through measures by member states in policy domains where the EU as such 
has little or no competences or capabilities, but where some coordination with EU policies 
is useful or essential; 
•  broaden and deepen the political dialogue with third countries or regions, allowing less 
formal and more frequent, flexible and purposive interaction, in addition to the political 
dialogue conducted by the Council (or presidency or troika) or Commission as is formally 
foreseen in the agreements with these partners; 
•  mediate or negotiate more closely with third parties to promote, elaborate or propose 
concrete solutions for specific problems; 
•  strengthen in a systematic way the coordination with other external actors that are active 
with regard to the area or issue at stake (such as other third countries, other regional 
organisations, UN agencies, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and non-
governmental organisations);  
•  intensify the dialogue among the EU core group’s member states to increase the 
convergence of views about the area or issue, to diminish differences in approach and 
narrow divergences in interests and, in this way, to increase the possibility of a more 
coherent and active common EU policy; and 
•  implement any other tasks that the Council may assign to an EU core group.  
Relationship with the legal and institutional framework of the EU and the 
general policies adopted within the EU  
In order to ensure that an EU core group does strengthen and not undermine EU foreign policy 
and to dispel distrust of a division of labour and specialisation within the EU, it is of great 
importance to clearly define the position of an EU core group within the broader institutional, 
legal and policy framework of the EU and to define the perimeters of an EU core group. 
First, an EU core group shall respect the principles of the Treaty on European Union and the 
Treaty establishing the European Community,
13 the legislation and other decisions adopted in 
the context of these treaties, as well as the competences, rights, obligations and interests of those 
member states that do not participate in it. An EU core group does not affect the formal 
competences of the Council, European Parliament or European Commission. It cannot replace 
the Council, European Parliament or Commission in adopting binding decisions for the EU as a 
whole, nor can it adopt political, financial or other commitments for the EU as a whole or for 
other member states that are not part of the EU core group.  
Second, through the Council, all member states remain involved in the policy-making process 
towards the geographical area or policy issue that is subject of the EU core group. The formal 
decisions and commitments adopted in the framework of the European Community (EC) and 
EU Treaties are basic components of the activities of the EU core group. Although an EU core 
group can contribute to looking for and suggesting new courses of action to tackle a specific 
foreign policy issue, when actions fall under the formal competences of the EC or EU, the 
formal decision-making procedures must be followed. It is equally important that all EU 
member states remain responsible for implementing and complying with the formal EU and EC 
decisions with regard to these areas and issues. In other words, the creation of an EU core group  
 
                                                      
13 This stance would also apply to the framework of the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
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for a specific issue does not diminish or remove the obligations and responsibilities of all EU 
member states to respect and implement commitments adopted within the EU and to support the 
Union’s policy towards that issue. 
Third, within the framework of the Council’s activities, the high representative, presidency 
and/or the Commission shall ensure that all member states are regularly informed about the EU 
core group’s activities and that the functioning of the EU core group does not run counter to the 
above-mentioned principles and restrictions. Like any EU member state, they can submit an 
initiative of an EU core group for discussion in the Council framework if it is thought to go 
against these principles and restrictions. 
Fourth, the high representative, presidency and/or the Commission shall ensure that the 
competent parliamentary committees of the European Parliament and the interparliamentary 
delegations are regularly informed about the activities of the EU core group and that the core 
group takes into consideration the resolutions, reports and other findings of the European 
Parliament. When the EU core group focuses on a specific third country or region, it can ensure 
the close involvement of and coordination with the relevant interparliamentary delegation for 
that third country or region, as this can contribute to the successful functioning of the core 
group. The EU core group can thus provide a flexible setting that facilitates interplay with the 
parliamentary actors and allows the relevant interparliamentary delegation to be more closely 
involved in EU foreign policy.  
Finally, it is clear that the member states’ representatives in the EU core group are responsible 
for the relationship with, input of and feedback for their own domestic political institutions, non-
governmental organisations and particularly their national parliaments. The latter is crucial for 
several reasons. Intensive interaction with the parliaments of the EU core group’s member states 
can increase the legitimacy of the actions of the core group and of EU foreign policy in general. 
It will assure the national members of parliaments that their country plays a major role in the 
shaping of EU foreign policy and that the foreign policy priorities and interests of their country 
are taken seriously in the EU context. Moreover, close interaction with the relevant national 
parliaments can also contribute to and even be necessary for these governments to step up their 
own efforts.  
Differences in comparison with enhanced cooperation and other flexibility 
clauses 
A further point that needs clarification is the distinction between EU core groups and the 
flexibility clauses that are foreseen in the existing treaties and particularly with the formula of 
enhanced cooperation.
14 The enhanced cooperation clause sought to facilitate foreign policy-
making in cases where not all member states wanted to proceed. But it did not provide the 
flexibility several member states had hoped for, because of its narrow scope and the heavy 
procedures and strict requirements for establishing it.
15 These factors also explain why the 
clause has not been used in practice. 
                                                      
14 For the relevant treaty articles on enhanced cooperation, see Arts. 27a-e, 40, 40a-b and 43-45, TEU and 
Arts. 11 and 11a, TEC. The other flexibility clause, the formula of constructive abstention (Art. 23, TEU), 
is more restricted in scope. For CFSP issues (except for decisions having military or defence 
implications) it allows for the possibility – under specific and limited conditions – that a country abstains 
from voting and is subsequently not obliged to apply the decision adopted in the Council. 
15 For an analysis of the enhanced cooperation clause in the Nice Treaty and an account of the underlying 
motivations, see Stubb (2002) and Jaeger (2002). 12 | STEPHAN KEUKELEIRE 
 
A system of specialised EU core groups has several advantages compared with the system of 
enhanced cooperation. EU core groups can be created in a more flexible and informal way, 
without the heavy procedures and without the minimum of eight member states required for 
enhanced cooperation. In contrast to enhanced cooperation, an EU core group makes it possible 
for the countries participating in the core group to act beyond the limits of the powers of the EU, 
as they can agree together about initiatives or measures that only commit themselves (if they at 
least respect the decisions and policies agreed in common in the EU). The scope of enhanced 
cooperation is restricted to the implementation of joint actions and common positions, excluding 
matters with military implications – restrictions that do not apply to EU core groups. Also in 
contrast to enhanced cooperation, the system of EU core groups is not necessarily a last resort 
mechanism: even policy fields that are already the subject of a dynamic EU policy can profit 
from the specialisation and division of labour of an EU core group. Finally, although in EU core 
groups decisions are to be adopted by consensus (whereas under the enhanced cooperation 
formula qualified majority voting is formally allowed), the smaller number of actors involved in 
an EU core group should facilitate decision-making. 
It is interesting in this regard to look at the provisions on flexibility that were included in the 
Treaty on a Constitution for Europe. The amendments to the provisions on enhanced 
cooperation did not substantially increase the prospect of a greater usefulness of this formula.
16 
In its section on the common security and defence policy, however, the Treaty did include a 
major innovation that goes to some extent in the direction of the flexibility proposed in the EU 
core-group system. After enumerating in Art. III-309 the tasks in the course of which the Union 
may use civilian and military means, Art. III-310 reads as follows: 
Within the framework of the European decision adopted in accordance with Article III-309, 
the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which 
are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in 
association with the Union Minister for Foreign Affairs, shall agree among themselves on 
the management of the task.
17 
This provision could be a major step in the direction of increased flexibility. Yet it is not as far-
reaching as the system of specialised EU core groups presented here. A system of specialised 
EU core groups has two major advantages. First, it allows for the support of the EU’s general 
policy towards a specific geographical area or policy issue over a longer period of time (and is 
thus not restricted to the implementation of a specific European decision as in the case of Art. 
III-310). Second, a system of core groups allows for a comprehensive and integrated approach 
that includes the various policy domains (and is thereby not restricted to the common security 
and defence policy). But as the chances of a ratification of the Constitutional Treaty are rather 
slim, this comparison becomes somewhat irrelevant – with the EU losing even this limited but 
nevertheless useful flexibility clause. 
                                                      
16 See Arts. I-44, III-416-424 of the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe; see also Törö (2005). 
17 The second paragraph of this article continues as follows: “Member States participating in the task shall 
keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another 
Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail 
major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task 
in the European decisions referred to in paragraph I. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary 
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4.  Advantages of the EU core groups 
After elaborating the various features of a mechanism of specialised EU core groups, it is 
necessary to give more in-depth consideration to the potential advantages of such a mechanism 
as well as its possible limitations, drawbacks and risks. 
Increasing the relevance of EU foreign policy  
A system of EU core groups provides the EU with a device to overcome the obstacles analysed 
in the first section of this paper: the predominance of uncommon interests, the member states’ 
lack of interest in each other’s foreign policy objectives, the resulting obstructionism in EU 
foreign policy-making and the impression of member states that the EU is not promoting their 
foreign policy priorities. EU core groups make it possible to develop a more dynamic foreign 
policy in dossiers considered important by a certain number of member states, which in turn 
increases the relevance of EU foreign policy for them. While remaining committed to and 
involved in the foreign policy of the EU as a whole, member states can, within the EU foreign 
policy framework, focus their efforts more intensively on areas that are important to them.  
Vice versa, a system of EU core groups also enhances the relevance of national foreign policy 
actors within the EU as it gives a more prominent role to individual member states within EU 
foreign policy. A system of EU core groups can strengthen the feeling of national diplomats and 
ministers of foreign affairs that, in an EU with 25 or more member states, they can make a 
difference. In view of the smaller number of participants in an EU core group and of the 
valuable assets participating countries can offer, membership in an EU core group increases the 
chances that their perspectives, proposals and initiatives are taken seriously. Important from the 
viewpoint of national politicians is also that membership in a dynamic EU core group will make 
it easier for them to make it clear to the general public, the media, their colleagues and other 
politicians that they play a significant role within the EU’s foreign policy system. As EU core 
groups align themselves with foreign policy issues traditionally covered by the national media, 
the EU’s foreign policy visibility will also grow, which can further increase its legitimacy. 
Increasing the member states’ sense of ownership 
A major advantage of EU core groups is that it can increase the member states’ sense of 
ownership and stimulate the national diplomacies to take greater responsibility in one or more 
specific dossiers of EU foreign policy. As manifest stakeholders, participating countries will 
commit more time and resources to make their EU core group a success. They will also take 
more responsibility for ensuring vertical and horizontal consistency along with cooperation 
among national diplomacies, as these factors will be important for achieving results. When 
member states are persuaded that EU foreign policy also furthers their traditional foreign policy 
priorities, they may increase their commitment towards and investment in EU foreign policy in 
general. Member states may also be more willing to accept a rise in the EU budget for foreign 
policy when they are convinced that it provides real added value for their foreign policy 
concerns.  
Increasing the effectiveness and external credibility of EU foreign policy  
A system of EU core groups, while not being a guarantee of success, nonetheless raises the 
potential effectiveness of the EU as a foreign policy actor. First, it provides the EU with a 
mechanism to bring together all its relevant actors – EU institutions as well as individual 
member states – whose influence, expertise and other assets are essential to tackling specific 
foreign policy issues. It is useful to remember that third parties in a conflict often take the EU 14 | STEPHAN KEUKELEIRE 
 
seriously only if the most relevant member states are closely involved in its foreign policy 
actions. Second, the system of EU core groups provides a small, informal and flexible 
framework, which is often crucial for conducting foreign policy. The limitation on the number 
of actors makes it easier to share sensitive information, to act swiftly to external changes and to 
conduct complex negotiations. Moreover, this small setting is not only useful in the contacts 
with other actors, but also facilitates the internal cohesion of the EU core group and helps to 
overcome differences in view – which as such can contribute to the effectiveness of the EU core 
groups. Third, the effectiveness of the EU’s foreign policy can be enhanced as a result of the 
greater continuity and availability of the relevant EU actors in that specific policy area. Fourth, 
as mentioned earlier, the effectiveness of EU foreign policy actions can also improve as a result 
of the strengthened vertical and horizontal consistency and as a result of the larger commitment 
of the member states vis-à-vis EU foreign policy.
18 
Alleviating the institutional constraints of the Council structures 
The system of EU core groups provides at least a partial solution to several problems of the 
current institutional framework – problems that would not completely disappear if the Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe were to ever enter into force.
19 In general, a system of EU 
core groups can contribute to overcoming the current lack of institutional flexibility, which 
makes it difficult to bring together a small group of relevant member states and to react quickly 
to changes in a specific policy area. More specifically, it helps to tackle some limitations of the 
main institutional actors. 
An EU core-group system can help to reduce several of the constraints of the high 
representative for the CFSP (or of the EU minister for foreign affairs) and of the presidency. 
Despite his status and growing influence, High Representative Solana is restricted by his 
resources, the inability to ensure permanent personal involvement and leadership in all areas of 
EU foreign policy, and his varying authority and expertise. This authority and expertise is very 
pronounced in some cases – such as in the Balkans – but less so with regard to many other 
regions. The same is true concerning the much more striking limitations of the presidency. In 
this regard, a system of EU core groups can help to alleviate the lack of continuity and 
consistency, the often constrained resources, expertise, experience and availability, the 
frequently limited internal and external credibility and legitimacy, as well as the lack of interest 
and commitment in some cases. 
Finally, a system of EU core groups can to some extent provide an answer to the dual disease of 
too many participants and too many items on the agenda, which undermines the Council of 
Ministers and the Council’s various substructures. As a device for a sensible division of labour 
and specialisation, a system of EU core groups can provide significant relief to the 
overburdened and overcrowded Council structures. At the same time, it can strengthen the 
operational capacities of the Council by enhancing the quality of the policy preparation and 
follow-up. As previously mentioned, a system of EU core groups also assures national ministers 
of foreign affairs and diplomats that in an EU with 25 member states they are still relevant and 
can make a difference. 
                                                      
18 The account of David Owen (1995, pp. 179-83 and 296-99) on the Contact Group on Bosnia clearly 
demonstrates these various advantages of a restricted and informal group – as well as its limitations. See 
also Keukeleire (2001). 
19 On the provisions on foreign policy in the Constitutional Treaty and the remaining constraints, see 
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Strengthening the impact of Commission initiatives 
A system of EU core groups can also alleviate the constraints of the Commission to some 
extent, which does not always possess the legal competence or political weight to use its 
instruments as leverage in EU foreign policy. Although some might worry that EU core groups 
could undermine the EU’s Community method and the position of the various Community 
actors and the European Commission in particular, the contrary may be true for several reasons. 
First, the European Commission systematically takes measures and initiatives with regard to 
specific third countries, regions, crises or other foreign policy dossiers. Yet these actions often 
have rather limited impact, either because they are not sufficiently embedded in a broader policy 
supported by the other EU institutions and the member states, or because they lack the political 
backing and support of the Council and member states. The Commission also frequently 
proposes very relevant foreign policy measures and initiatives, which sometimes receive little to 
no attention in the Council. A system of EU core groups may contribute to reducing these 
problems. It provides a pertinent sounding board for the Commission’s ideas and it brings the 
Commission together with other interested stakeholders from member states that may help to 
generate support in the Council for the initiatives and proposals of the Commission. Second, it 
is often the case that member states that are reluctant in the general foreign policy debate to use 
the Community method and involve the Commission (and the first pillar in general) are in 
practice much more pragmatic if it serves their interests in concrete foreign policy dossiers. In 
concrete dossiers where civil servants and diplomats from the Commission and member states 
work closely together to tackle specific foreign policy problems, the national actors tend to 
consider the Commission’s expertise, budgetary instruments and external network as quite 
useful and are willing to bring into play EC policies and instruments if that facilitates their 
foreign policy objectives.
20 Third, a system of EU core groups at least guarantees the 
participation of the Commission, which is not the case with various existing contact groups and 
other informal fora.  
Reducing the cleavage between large and small member states 
Among the major tensions in EU foreign policy is the tension between large and small member 
states. A system of EU core groups can ameliorate these tensions to some extent because it takes 
into consideration the qualitative difference between the largest EU countries and the other 
countries in the EU, without marginalising or excluding the middle-sized and smaller EU 
countries. Smaller member states will probably be members of only one or two EU core groups, 
while middle-sized countries will participate in more groups and the larger member states will 
take part in many more, reflective of their extensive capabilities, interests and ambitions. The 
requirement to devote extra effort and national resources as a member of an EU core group will 
prevent the largest member states from joining all EU core groups, as London, Paris and Berlin 
also have their budgetary and other constraints and have to set priorities.
21   
The major advantage here is that a system with various EU core groups does not exclude any 
member state from participating in an EU core group that it considers as crucial and to which it 
                                                      
20 The case of the existing EU Core Group for Somalia is quite illustrative in this respect, as it reveals 
how countries that are renowned for their clear preference for an intergovernmental approach and for their 
scepticism towards the European Commission (the UK, Sweden and Italy under Premier Silvio 
Berlusconi) in practice worked closely together with the Commission. Nevertheless, there are other 
examples in which member states maintained their principled position against Commission involvement.  
21 The EU Core Group for Somalia was again interesting in this sense. Initially, France and Germany 
were also members of this group, but refrained from further participation when a larger diplomatic and 
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commits itself for additional efforts. The question is not whether a country is small or large, but 
whether a country is relevant for a specific foreign policy matter and can provide added value to 
EU foreign policy. This way, a smaller country may not only be a relevant member but may also 
take the lead in an area of national importance. Equally important is that this system combines 
the use of smaller informal frameworks with the assured involvement of the EU institutions, 
allowing for flexibility without relying upon ad hoc formulas.  
5.  Limitations and risks 
This paper argues that a system of EU core groups can lead to a more dynamic EU foreign 
policy and can contribute to tackling some of the problems and obstacles of EU foreign policy. 
It is clear, however, that this system will not solve every problem of EU foreign policy and that 
it is not without risks.  
A system of EU core groups will not help when member states defend incompatible interests in 
a dossier or when they have major disagreements about the course to be followed. In such cases, 
the use of a system of EU core groups should indeed be completely excluded as it could 
reinforce cleavages in the EU. The same is true regarding major disagreements and diverging 
interests between the Council and the Commission. That being said, minor disagreements 
among the participating countries and institutions should not be significant obstacles: an EU 
core group can provide the necessary small setting to help them to overcome differences in view 
and to gradually strengthen mutual understanding. 
Tensions between EC/EU policies and EU core-group approaches 
What are the risks of a system of EU core groups? A first risk is that an EU core group 
gradually adopts an approach that runs counter to the common policy developed by the EU as a 
whole. This situation could arise if one member state gradually starts to dominate the activities 
of the EU core group and imposes its own perspective without sufficiently accounting for the 
policies and approaches of the other group members or of the EU as a whole. A diverging 
approach could also result from the typical dilemma in foreign policy-making in conflict areas: 
close involvement in mediation efforts in a conflict can force an EU core group to adopt a much 
more pragmatic attitude than the EU’s official policy line dictates. For instance, peace 
negotiations or peace-building efforts may be possible only if negotiations are started with 
influential leaders of armed groups or extremist groups – even if they have violated human 
rights or have been involved in atrocities or terrorist activities. Yet this may be irreconcilable 
with the formal position of the EU (i.e. when these leaders are put on the EU’s list of terrorists 
or when the respect for human rights is seen as the major goal). It may also be unacceptable for 
those EU member states that are not involved in the EU core group’s activities and do not 
accept that the basic values and principles of EU foreign policy are renounced.  
A second problem could arise when the actions of an EU core group – particularly when they 
are successful – increase the pressure on the EU as a whole to adapt its policy or to enter into 
new engagements. It may also result in new expectations on the part of third countries or 
international organisations towards the EU as a whole (i.e. with regard to additional financial 
support from the EU, the intensification of diplomatic relations or the use of crisis-management 
instruments). The dynamic of international relations may make it very difficult to avert these 
pressures or expectations. The problem becomes particularly pointed when the EU core group 
explicitly or implicitly enters into commitments in policy domains that fall under the 
competences of the EC or the EU as a whole. In a more subtle way, in its negotiations with  
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other actors an EU core group can refer to certain EC or EU assets as leverage (as carrots or 
sticks). Even if the EU core group does not engage in new commitments, it can raise 
expectations on the part of other actors.
22 
Another problem may arise when the Commission decides to spend financial resources in 
support of the objectives and activities of the EU core group. In principle, this is not a problem 
if the Commission has the authority to decide on the implementation of the EU budget. Nor is it 
a problem if there is no shortage of financial means. It may lead to discussions, though, if the 
budget for that area or type of policy initiative is limited and if such a decision can impact the 
financial means available for other policy initiatives that are considered to be more important by 
other member states.
23 
What can be done to counter these potential risks? As has been pointed out before, a system of 
EU core groups includes some checks and balances as well as guarantees for non-members (if 
only through the presence of representatives of the Commission, presidency and high 
representative). One of the main guarantees is that any member state as well as the Commission, 
Council presidency and high representative can refer such problems to the Council of Ministers, 
to obtain assurance from the EU core group that it is following the agreed policy line, is not 
committing the EU as a whole or that it will submit sensitive policy matters to all EU member 
states. The Council can also force the high representative and the presidency (or their 
representatives) to stop participating in the activities of the group, which would put an end to 
the functioning of the EU core group. Moreover, a member state, the Council or the 
Commission can bring an action to the Court of Justice on grounds of lack of competence, 
infringement of an essential procedural requirement, misuse of powers, or infringement of the 
EC Treaty or of any rule of law relating to its application (Art. 230, EC). Nevertheless, it is clear 
that this will not solve problems that stem from, for instance, expectations or pressures 
generated by the EU core group’s activities about the policy of the EU as a whole. Nor will 
these checks and balances solve other problems, such as the fact that the failure or mistakes of 
an EU core group may bring EU foreign policy as a whole into discredit. 
A renationalisation of foreign policy? 
Two other fundamental objections can be formulated against a system of EU core groups: first 
is the objection that it may undermine the common policy of the EU; second is the concern that 
it could lead to a renationalisation of foreign policy. These concerns are raised regularly in 
debates on the role of small groups of states. Yet they do not really hold weight, as they are 
based on minimalist interpretations of ‘policy’ as well as exaggerated assumptions about the 
current ‘common’ level of foreign policy integration.  
With regard to the first concern, on many concrete foreign policy issues an EU core group 
cannot undermine the EU’s common policy, for the simple reason that there is no common 
policy of the EU – if by ‘policy’ we refer to something beyond contractual relations with third 
                                                      
22 The negotiations of the EU-3 with Iran in 2004-05 demonstrated the problems that this can generate. 
The main focus and reason for the EU-3’s establishment was the nuclear build-up of Iran, where the 
status of the UK and France explained why these countries took the lead. In the negotiations with 
Teheran, however, the EU-3 also touched upon policy domains that fell under the competence of the EC 
or EU, such as the possibility of a trade and cooperation agreement and political dialogue on human 
rights. 
23 An example of this occurred in 2005 when, as a result of the positive effects of the EU core group on 
Somalia, the Commission decided to commit financial resources from the African Peace Facility to 
Somalia. This action led to critical remarks among other member states that it diminished the money 
available for other policy actions in Africa (such as in Sudan or the Great Lakes Region). 18 | STEPHAN KEUKELEIRE 
 
partners (e.g. Cooperation or Association Agreements with third countries) and beyond rather 
general ‘declaratory’ policy (the promotion of democracy and human rights, declaratory support 
for the peaceful resolution of conflicts, etc.). With regard to the second concern, many foreign 
policy issues cannot be ‘renationalised’ because, in fact, these issues are still primarily 
addressed through the national foreign policies of some individual member states. These states – 
and not the EU as a whole – do have an active, operational and problem-solving oriented 
foreign policy. A nationalisation of foreign policy issues will not result from a system of EU 
core groups (since a link with the general EU policy and EU institutions is guaranteed), but will 
rather follow from the inclination of member states to shape their foreign policy outside the EU 
framework if the EU setting is considered as unhelpful. 
In other words, a system of EU core groups can precisely help efforts to both ‘Europeanise’ the 
operational policy towards foreign policy issues and add a common operational dimension to 
the existing common declaratory and contractual relations-based policy – even if such 
Europeanisation and common policies are the outcomes of a certain degree of division of labour 
and specialisation in the foreign policy of the EU. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper claims that, for reasons of legitimacy, visibility and effectiveness, the EU could 
benefit significantly from a mechanism allowing closer cooperation on specific foreign policy 
issues among a limited number of member states and between these states and the various 
Brussels-based EU foreign policy actors. A joining of forces of a limited number of EU member 
states is generally looked upon with suspicion and even hostility as it is associated with 
directoires or contact groups or seen as counter to the idea of a common foreign policy. This 
paper asserts that – under certain conditions – the specialisation and division of labour within 
the EU’s foreign policy is not only reconcilable with the EU’s ‘common’ foreign policy, but can 
also strengthen the EU as a foreign policy actor and may even be essential as the EU grows. 
Paradoxically, although a system of EU core groups grants a more prominent role to the 
member states within the foreign policy of the EU, it can make EU foreign policy more 
effective and EU institutions and policies more relevant. Equally paradoxically, although a 
system of EU core groups explicitly recognises the existence of uncommon interests and 
introduces some division of labour for member states, this system can actually bring more unity 
and consistency to EU foreign policy and increase the EU’s credibility. This system, moreover, 
accounts for the realities of both world politics and EU foreign policy.  
A system of EU core groups may become even more necessary now that the prospect of a 
ratification of the Treaty on a Constitution for Europe seems dim. As the appointment of an EU 
minister for foreign affairs and the creation of a European External Action Service are less 
likely, the expected improvements in terms of effectiveness, dynamism and consistency also 
seem far off. A system of EU core groups may therefore be useful or even crucial in order to 
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